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This paper combines insights from generation-one currency crisis models and the
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) to create a new generation-one type model.
Fiscal solvency is the fundamental generating crises, as in generation-one models. The
initial ￿xed-exchange-rate policy entails risks, both to its sustainability and to the
real value of government debt. The risks are due to stochastic surplus shocks and an
upper bound on the present value of surpluses. Stochastic surplus shocks, changes in
expectations of future ￿scal commitments, and changes in the policy parameters can
raise current desired debt or reduce expected future surpluses. Should the government￿ s
desired debt exceed the present-value of expected future surpluses, agents refuse to
lend into this position of insolvency. The sudden stop of capital in￿ ows creates a
crisis. Equilibrium can be restored with some combination of policy switching and
debt devaluation to restore ￿scal solvency. The model can explain a wider variety of
crises than generation one models, including those involving sovereign default. It is
applied to explain crises in Argentina (2001), Mexico (1994-95), and Southeast Asia
(1997), which did not ￿t the stylized facts of generation one models.
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1 Introduction
The generation one model of exchange rate crises (Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1984)
provided invaluable insights into the causes of exchange rate crises, o⁄ering an explanation for
many of the crises of the 1980￿ s, in which government budget de￿cits and declining reserves
played prominent roles. Yet, the model failed to explain many crises after 1990, including
those with obvious ￿scal roots (Argentina 2001), as well as those with less obvious ￿scal
roots (Mexico, 1994-95; Southeast Asia 1997). The model failed to explain the Argentine
crisis because the central role for reserves implies that a currency-board country should have
been immune from a speculative attack. It failed to explain crises in Mexico and Southeast
Asia because these countries did not have government budget de￿cits, and because Mexico
sterilized the e⁄ects of the speculative attack on its money supply.
These failures led researchers to modify the generation one model with speci￿cs, which
would allow it to explain particular crises, and to develop new generations of exchange rate
crisis models. New generation models do not use ￿scal solvency as a fundamental determinant
of crises. We argue that many exchange rate crises, including many of those which occurred
in the 1990￿ s, can be explained in a model which retains ￿scal insolvency as the fundamental
generating the crisis. From a policy perspective, it important to understand the impact of
policy on crisis risk.
We develop a "generation-one" type exchange rate crisis model which can explain a wider
1variety of crises than the original by using insights from both the original model and the
"Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" (FTPL). The model presented here is a conditional policy-
switching model, as was the original, in which monetary policy switched from ￿xed exchange
rates to ￿ exible once ￿xed became infeasible. The initial policy mix in this model does not
require government de￿cits ￿nanced by declining reserves. Instead, it combines passive ￿scal
policy and ￿xed exchange rates, supported by active monetary policy.1 Under passive ￿scal
policy the government surplus adjusts to past debt assuring intertemporal budget balance
for any initial value of real debt. Temporary stochastic shocks to the primary surplus create
permanent changes in debt, as in Barro￿ s (1979) optimal tax-smoothing model, ultimately
requiring adjustment in the primary surplus to service the debt. The stochastic shocks
can originate in the private sector, as with a banking crisis which increases expected future
government expenditures, or in the public sector with an unexpected change in taxes or
spending. Shocks to both the current surplus and the expected present-value of future
surpluses are possible.
In the absence of any additional constraints, this policy-mix is viable inde￿nitely. How-
ever, a series of negative stochastic shocks could require very large values for future surpluses
to service the debt, and every government faces limits on its abilities to raise taxes. These
limits imply an upper bound on the present value of future surpluses, and equivalently on
debt. When ￿scal policy is subject to stochastic shocks and an upper bound on debt, there
is risk that the initial policy mix might not be inde￿nitely viable. Therefore, the ￿rst signif-
icant departure from generation one models is replacement of the assumption of government
1 Leeper (1991) demonstrated that for equilibrium to exist, both monetary and ￿scal policy cannot be active.
2spending ￿nanced by declining reserves and yielding inevitable crisis, with the assumption
of a policy mix yielding crisis risk.2
We show that any shock which creates su¢ cient deterioration in the current or expected
future ￿scal position relative to the expected upper bound can create a crisis. The overall
￿scal position becomes the determinant of a crisis. A crisis need not be preceded by money-
￿nanced government de￿cits, since shocks which deteriorate expected future ￿scal positions
or the upper bound can also create a crisis. We show that in equilibrium agents will not lend
into a position for which they expect the government￿ s intertemporal budget to be violated
because they could not expect to receive the market rate of return. An endogenous sudden
stop of capital ￿ ows, which prevents the government from borrowing to continue its desired
￿scal policy, de￿nes the crisis. The sudden stop of capital plays the role of the speculative
attack on reserves in the generation one model and is an essential component of the ￿scal
solvency model.
Since the crisis is caused by ￿scal insolvency, its resolution requires a policy response to
restore solvency. In generation one models, solvency is achieved with increased seigniorage
revenues, created by increased money growth. The second major departure from generation
one models is that solvency can be restored through devaluation of nominal debt, created
by currency depreciation. The model does not rule out an increase in seigniorage, but
additional seigniorage is not necessary. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001, 2006)
present evidence that debt devaluation played a larger role than increased seigniorage in
2 Flood and Garber (1984) extend Krugman￿ s (1989) original model to allow stochastic money growth to
determine the exact timing, but not the inevitability of a crisis.
3restoring ￿scal solvency following many of the 1990￿ s exchange rate crises. Although their
model modi￿es the original generation one model to allow an unexpected increase in future
government expenditures to cause an exchange rate crisis, it retains the central role for
seigniorage created by money growth in restoring ￿scal solvency.3
We consider several types of policy responses. The ￿rst is a promise of ￿scal reform, with
a switch to active ￿scal policy as in the literature on the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level"
(FTPL). With active ￿scal policy, monetary policy must be passive, requiring exchange rate
￿ exibility. The switch creates larger near-term surpluses, which serve to raise the expected
present-value surplus. If the present-value surplus is still too low relative to debt after the
policy switch, exchange rate depreciation, reducing the real value of outstanding government
debt, is necessary to restore ￿scal solvency. Since depreciation is possible, interest rates rise
in anticipation of the crisis. Post-crisis seigniorage does not have to rise, and if the monetary
authority￿ s in￿ ation target does not change, then the monetary authority must sterilize the
e⁄ect of the speculative attack on the money supply.
Previous papers have shown that ￿scal policy switching from passive to active can cre-
ate an exchange rate crisis. Sims (1997) considers a switching probability conditioned on
outstanding government debt, and Daniel (2001b) analyzes an unexpected decrease in the
present-value of future surpluses. Other policy-switching models include those of Davig and
Leeper (2006) and Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007), who consider the implications of sto-
chastic policy-switching in a closed economy. This paper presents a dynamic model in which
3 The dynamics of crisis timing relies on particular assumptions about the time path of money growth. In
the model presented here, money growth is not central.
4policy-switching is neither a one-time unexpected event nor a stochastic event occurring
without a crisis according to some, possibly conditional, probability. Instead, policy switch-
ing is one way that a government can choose to respond to a sudden stop in capital ￿ ows.
The policy switch allows currency depreciation and restores ￿scal solvency, resolving the
crisis. The government￿ s expected response a⁄ects expectations and de￿nes the dynamics
leading up to the crisis. When the government responds with policy switching, the resulting
model is a dynamic FTPL model of exchange rate crises.
FTPL policy switching is not the only possible response to the sudden stop of capital
￿ ows. A government could devalue and repeg at a lower exchange rate, while maintaining
the existing policy mix. We show, however, that such a policy implies a post-crisis period of
instability with continued arbitrarily high depreciations. Alternatively, a government could
receive an IMF loan to replace private capital ￿ ows, conditional on policy change which
increases the present value of future surpluses, thereby restoring solvency. However, raising
surpluses in the face of economic shocks which have reduced them could be politically and
economically painful and might not be desirable when debt devaluation is available as a
source of revenue. This could explain why IMF loans are often combined with exchange rate
depreciation, allowing domestic-currency debt devaluation.
We use the model to explain several crises after 1990, which were arguably caused by ￿scal
shocks, but which the original generation-one model cannot explain. This demonstrates that
￿scal solvency plays a greater role in causing exchange rate crises than the original generation
one model would imply.
5This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
characterizes the dynamics leading to exchange rate crises when they are caused by current
￿scal shocks. Section 4 considers other causes of exchange rate crises, and Section 5 applies
the model to several crises after 1990. Section 5 contains conclusions.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
In this section, we set up a simple model of a small open economy which we can use to address
￿scal risk. The model contains four key assumptions. First, international creditors lend to a
government only when they expect to receive the market rate of return. Second, the domestic
government issues debt denominated in its own currency. Third, there is an upper bound
on the value of government debt. Fourth, ￿scal policy implies risk on government debt,
re￿ ecting the reality that a government￿ s commitment to raise taxes to ￿nance expenditures
cannot be totally unconditional.
We ￿ll out the model with enough structure to obtain an equation for the evolution
of government debt over time. This requires speci￿cation of monetary and ￿scal policy
as well as government budget constraints. We assume that the monetary authority has
a price level target, ￿xing the exchange rate, and that the ￿scal authority follows a rule
relating the current surplus to past debt. The rule is subject to stochastic shocks, giving
￿scal policy risk. The rule we choose is simple and does not require full speci￿cation of a
general equilibrium model. However, any rule with ￿scal risk could be used to complete the
model. The government￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint, combined with the ￿scal rule, determines
6the expected behavior of debt over time. To keep the model simple, we set output growth
to zero.4
2.2 Goods and Asset Markets
We assume that there is a single good in the world, implying that goods markets equilibrium
requires the law of one price. Normalizing the world price level at unity and assuming no
world in￿ ation implies yields an equilibrium price level in the small open economy equal to
the exchange rate.
The ￿rst key assumption in the model is that international creditors are willing to buy
and sell the small economy￿ s government bonds as long as its interest rate, it, satis￿es interest
rate parity. Interest rate parity can be derived as the Euler equation for a representative
world agent when the covariance of the country￿ s interest rate with world-agent consumption
is zero, or when the world agent is risk neutral. Under the additional assumption that the












where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information, and St denotes the
exchange rate and equivalently the domestic price level. The interest rate can rise above the
world interest rate when there is some possibility of an exchange rate crisis which will be
resolved with depreciation.5
4 This can be modi￿ed, as we do in the section where we apply the model to explain actual crises.
5 When we consider the possibility of default, the interest rate parity equation must be modi￿ed such that
expected returns on domestic debt, conditional on the possibility of default, equal world returns.
72.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to have a ￿xed exchange rate (price level) target.6 When there
is no possibility of a change in the exchange rate in the next period, interest rate parity,
from equation (1), implies that the domestic interest rate equals the world rate.
2.4 Fiscal Policy
2.4.1 Government Flow Budget Constraint
The second key assumption is that government bonds are denominated in domestic cur-
rency.7 This assumption is based on work by Jeanne and Guscina (2006), who show that
even in emerging markets, a substantial fraction of government debt is denominated in do-
mestic currency. Additionally, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001, 2006) show that
in several crises in the 1990￿ s, debt devaluation was a larger source of government revenue
than money growth.8
Letting Gt and Tt denote nominal government spending and tax revenue, respectively,
the government￿ s nominal ￿ ow budget constraint is given by
Bt + Mt = (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1 + Mt￿1 + Gt ￿ Tt: (2)
6 We do not model the implementation of this target. It could be implemented in a model in which the
monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate, controling expected in￿ ation. Control of the price
level could then be achieved with an unstable policy rule, whereby the price level must jump to assure
equilibrium.
7 We could allow some government bonds to be denominated in foreign currency with no substantive change
to the analysis, as long as some bonds are denominated in domestic currency. Magnitudes would change
with larger depreciation needed the smaller the fraction of domestic-currency debt in total debt.
8 Their papers retain the central role of an increase in money growth in restoring ￿scal solvency. In their
model, the increase in money growth generates additional sources of ￿scal revenue, including debt devalua-
tion.







































and imposing interest rate parity from equation (1) yields9
bt = (1 + i)bt￿1 ￿ (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) ￿ st: (4)
This reveals that interest-exclusive debt accumulates in response to expectations of depreci-
ation which are not realized. Expectations of depreciation raise the interest rate, and when
the depreciation does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest rate.
Optimization by the representative agent, together with the assumption that governments
do not allow their debt to become negative in the limit, implies a government intertemporal

















9 First, substitute for ￿t in equation (3) yielding bt = (1 + it￿1)bt￿1 ￿￿t ￿st: Then use interest rate parity






















= (1 + it￿1)bt￿1 ￿ Et￿1￿t: and substituting, the
equation becomes (1 + it￿1)bt￿1 ￿ Et￿1￿t = (1 + i)bt￿1: Solving for (1 + it￿1)bt￿1 and substituting into
the ￿rst equation above yields the expression in the text.
10Woodford (1994) derives of the constraint as an equilibrium condition for a closed economy.
9Note that surprise depreciation (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t > 0) is a source of government revenue.
2.4.2 Upper Bound
The third key assumption is that there is an upper bound on the present value of future
primary surpluses, equivalently on the current value of debt. We motivate this assumption
with the realization that taxes are distortionary such that there exists an upper bound on
the present value of taxes that the government can collect. Since the primary surplus must
service the debt in the long run, the upper bound on the value of debt implies an upper
bound on the value for the surplus in the long run.
The upper bounds on the long-run values for debt and the surplus are related according
to
i￿ b = ￿ s: (6)
It is important to recognize that agents have no data which reveals the magnitude of this
upper bound. Therefore, the upper bound is an expectational variable, subject to both
political and economic shocks. We assume that changes in the expectation are rare and
occur in response to a major political or economic event.
2.4.3 Fiscal Policy Rule
Fiscal policy is de￿ned by the behavior of the primary surplus. We assume that the ￿scal
authority is able to commit to a surplus rule,11 in which the surplus responds to its own lag
and a linear combination of a long-run target value for the primary surplus and debt service
11The rule gives the government credibility, limiting the e⁄ect of negative ￿scal shocks on the expected
present value of future surpluses.
10at the world interest rate. The surplus rule is given by12
st = (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿) ^ s + ￿ibt￿1] + ￿t; (7)
i
1 + i
< ￿ < 1; 0 ￿ ￿; 0 < ^ s ￿ ￿ s ￿ ￿ ￿;
where ^ s is the long-run target value for the primary surplus, (1 ￿ a) measures persistence
in the primary surplus, ￿ represents the responsiveness of the surplus to the value for debt
service relative to its target value, and ￿t is a bounded, stochastic disturbance representing
￿scal shocks (￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿ ￿). The lagged value of the primary surplus re￿ ects the desire to
smooth the e⁄ect of shocks over time and is consistent with empirical evidence showing
persistence in the primary surplus.13
Fiscal shocks (￿t) contain all determinants of the surplus not explicitly included in the
surplus rule, many of which would be explicit if the model were placed in a full general
equilibrium context. Changes in ￿t represent changes in government spending and/or taxes
in response to exogenous events like a war, natural disaster, or political change, as well as the
optimal policy response to economic events like a business cycle. With this interpretation,
policy authorities have some control over ￿t: They control the response to shocks, but not the
shocks themselves. We generally assume that the conditional mean of ￿t is zero. However,
we do consider a current shock to expected future surpluses, which has the interpretation of
12Recognizing that ^ s = i^ b; the surplus rule can be written as





This shows that the surplus increases when the long-run target value is above the current value and when
debt is above the long-run target value.








under the assumption that the ￿scal authority can adjust the surplus to
o⁄set these. We are also assuming that the government chooses real expenditures and taxes.
11a non-zero mean for ￿t on particular future dates.
Equations (7) and (4), yield dynamic equations for the surplus and debt
st = (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ s + ￿￿ibt￿1 + ￿t (8)
bt = (1 + i ￿ ￿￿i)bt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ s ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t + Et￿1￿t: (9)
Letting ￿ represent eigenvalues, which are assumed to be real and distinct, the characteristic
equation is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + i) ￿ ￿[1 + i(1 ￿ ￿￿) + 1 ￿ ￿] + ￿
2 = 0:
Much of the literature on the optimal ￿nancing of stochastic government spending, when
taxes are distortionary, can be framed in terms of the value for ￿: When ￿ = 1, one root
is unity, and the other is (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + i); which is less than one under the assumptions in
equation (7). Under this parameterization, the model is stable around a long-run equilibrium
which has a unit root. Fiscal policy looks very much like Barro￿ s (1979) tax-smoothing model
in which transitory disturbances (￿t) are optimally ￿nanced by a permanent increase in debt.
The increased debt is serviced by a permanent increase in taxes raising the primary surplus.
Permanent spending disturbances are immediately re￿ ected in taxes and have no e⁄ect on
the surplus.14 Since debt is expected to reach a long-run equilibrium value, the government￿ s
intertemporal budget is balanced for any initial value of the price level. Therefore, a ￿scal
rule given by (8) with ￿ = 1 is passive ￿scal policy.
14With this interpretation permanent spending changes have no e⁄ect on the evolution of debt, implying
that this surplus rule does not nest the policy assumption in the original generation-one model. Barro￿ s
theoretical model has no surplus persistence, which appears empirically necessary.
12Alternatively, when ￿ = 0; one eigenvalue is inside the unit circle, and the other is outside
and equal to 1+i. The model is saddlepath stable around a stationary long-run equilibrium.
There are values for initial debt and the surplus, such that the debt eventually rises at the
rate of interest. Since such a path violates the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint,
there must be a jumping variable, which keeps the system on the saddlepath toward a long-
run equilibrium. The jumping variable is the price level Therefore, the ￿scal rule with this
parameterization is consistent with Chari, Christiano and Kehoe￿ s (1991) model in which
price (and exchange rate) surprises optimally ￿nance stochastic government spending. In
their framework, unexpected changes in the price level are not distortionary and are therefore
preferable to Barro￿ s distortionary taxes. However, Kumhof (2004) develops a model in which
price level jumps are distortionary, implying ambiguity about whether optimal policy should
￿nance stochastic government spending with distortionary taxes or distortionary price level
jumps. A ￿scal rule with ￿ = 0 is active ￿scal policy since intertemporal government budget
balance is not attained for all initial values of the price level.15
This paper is not designed to resolve the optimal tax issue, and we note that di⁄erent
governments choose di⁄erent policies. A government which chooses ￿xed exchange rates
cannot choose ￿ = 0; because ￿nancing stochastic expenditure with price and exchange rate
jumps is inconsistent with ￿xed exchange rates. A government which wants ￿xed exchange
15More generally, when 0 < ￿ < 1; and there are no upper bounds, one root exceeds unity but is less than
1 + i: The government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint is satis￿ed, but the upper bound constraint is
not. Since the system is saddlepath stable, a jumping variable could assure the upper bound constraint was
satis￿ed for values of the initial surplus and debt below long-run equilibrium values, whereas the absence
of a jumping variable would imply that the present value of surpluses would exceed their maximum feasible
value. This suggests that we should call such ￿scal policy active, when there is an upper bound.
13rates could use Barro￿ s tax smoothing model, setting ￿ = 1; as long as that policy implies that
debt will remain below its long-run upper bound. If the government chooses this ￿scal rule,
and stochastic shocks cumulate driving debt toward its upper bound, then the government
must have plans to change policy. We assume that agents know these plans and use them
to form expectations.
The fourth key assumption is that ￿scal policy entails risk. We assume that the
government chooses to ￿x the exchange rate and follows a ￿scal rule with ￿ = 1:16 Shocks to
the surplus, together with the upper bound, imply that the initial policy mix might not be
viable inde￿nitely. We consider alternative assumptions about how the government plans to
respond.
2.5 Stability and Dynamics in Equilibrium
2.5.1 Equilibrium with Initial Policy Mix
No Upper Bounds To facilitate understanding, consider equilibrium under the initial
active ￿xed-exchange rate monetary policy (￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0) and passive ￿scal policy (￿ = 1)
in the absence of upper bounds. Equilibrium under the initial policy mix in the absence of
upper bounds is de￿ned as:
De￿nition 1 Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, together with
a surplus rule from equation (8) with ￿ = 1 and a monetary policy ￿xing the exchange rate,
an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the surplus, debt, and capital loss on debt,
fbt;st;￿tg
1
t=0, such that the government￿ s ￿ow and intertemporal budget constraints, given by
equations (9) and (5), hold, expectations are rational, and world agents expect to receive the
return on assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1).
16A government could choose ￿ > 1, implying that the model is globally stable around a stationary long-run
equilibrium. However, the path to the long run could imply sustained high surpluses, violating the upper
bound on the present value of the surplus. This is explored in Daniel and Shiamptanis (2008).
14Equations (8) and (9) with can be solved for the time paths for the surplus and debt as a
function of initial values and the time path of shocks, (￿t; ￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t). Under passive ￿scal
policy, the time paths for the surplus and debt are given by
st = s￿1 +
￿[ib￿1 ￿ s￿1]
￿
1 ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + i)]
t+1￿
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bt = b￿1 +
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where we have retained the shock ￿t ￿Et￿1￿t because it￿ s value can be non-zero once upper
bounds are introduced.
It is useful to represent the dynamics of the debt-surpus system using phase diagrams.
Substituting for the current surplus from equation (7) into equation (4) and setting ￿ = 1
yields an equation for the real value of debt as a function of lagged values of debt and the
surplus. Subtracting lagged values of the debt from this equation and lagged values of the
surplus from equation (7) yields
￿st = st ￿ st￿1 = ￿[ibt￿1 ￿ st￿1] + ￿t (12)
￿bt = bt ￿ bt￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[ibt￿1 ￿ st￿1] ￿ (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) ￿ ￿t (13)
The phase diagram, with shocks at their expected values of zero, is given in Figure 1.
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Note that the ￿b = 0 and ￿s = 0 schedules lie on top of each other with st = ibt.
Either ￿scal shocks (￿t); expectations of depreciation (Et￿1￿t); or surprise depreciation
(￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) move the system away from the ￿s = ￿b = 0 locus. Conditional on initial
values, the system is always expected to reach a long-run equilibrium along the ￿s = ￿b = 0
locus with st = ibt; implying that the present-value of government debt is not expected to
explode in the limit. This assures government intertemporal budget balance (5) for any value
for ￿t; con￿rming that the ￿scal rule given by equation (12) is passive:
Passive ￿scal policy permits active monetary policy to ￿x the exchange rate such that
￿t = 0: Rational expectations assure Et￿1￿t = 0. When unexpected ￿scal shocks (￿t) move
the system away from the ￿s = ￿b = 0 locus, say to point H, equations (12) and (13)
16can be used to show that the expected relationship between debt and surpluses along the




i(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Et￿t+1
￿ + Et￿t+1
: (14)
Note that when the conditional mean of future ￿scal shocks is zero, the slope of the adjust-
ment path is constant, as drawn in Figure 1. However, negative expected future ￿scal shocks
e⁄ectively increase the slope of the adjustment path in periods for which they are expected,
implying higher expected long-run values for the debt and surplus for given initial values.
The expected long-run e⁄ect of a shock on the debt and surplus can be determined by
following the adjustment path, initialized by the current values of debt and the surplus, back
to the ￿s = ￿b = 0 locus. Equivalently, the long-run e⁄ects can be obtained from equations
(10) and (11) by taking the expected limits for values for the surplus and debt as t ! 1.
Shocks have long-run e⁄ects due to the unit root.
Equilibrium under the passive-￿scal-policy, ￿xed-exchange rate regime is always possible,
even though it might require very large values for the surplus in the long run. This is
because the system is always expected to return to the ￿s = ￿b = 0 locus, implying that
conditions for equilibrium, including the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint, are
always satis￿ed.
Upper Bounds Now, consider the implications of upper bounds for the dynamic behavior
of the debt and surplus. We assume that the government maintains both its commitments
to a ￿xed exchange rate and to the passive ￿scal rule until equilibrium under the initial
17policy mix is no longer feasible. A similar assumption in generation-one crisis models, that
money-￿nanced government spending continues until no longer possible, has been criticized
as suboptimal. Rebelo and Vegh (2002) have shown that it is optimal to abandon the ￿xed
exchange rate regime as soon as failure becomes inevitable. We demonstrate below that
under the policy assumed in this model, a crisis occurs as soon as it becomes inevitable,
satisfying the optimality criteria in Rebelo and Vegh (2002).17 Moreover, a country, which
continues to follow the rule when crisis probability becomes positive, could receive favorable
shocks and avoid the crisis.18
An upper bound on debt implies that there is an upper bound adjustment path above
which there is no passive-￿scal policy active-monetary policy equilibrium. Consider a position
for debt and the surplus above HF in Figure 1. In the absence of an upper bound, the system
would be expected to travel to a position along the ￿s = ￿b = 0 locus above F. However,
when long-run debt has an upper bound of ￿ b; the long-run position implied by an initial
position above HF is infeasible. Therefore, adjustment paths above HF cannot represent
equilibrium paths and rational agents would not embark on such paths.
A crisis occurs when the passive-￿scal-policy, ￿xed-exchange-rate equilibrium becomes
impossible. This occurs when shocks and/or expectations send the system above an upper
bound adjustment path. The visible symptom in markets is a sudden stop in capital ￿ ows
whereby agents refuse to lend as much as the government wants to borrow. To restore
17Note that a permanent increase in government spending, ￿nanced initially by declining reserves (increasing
debt) is not optimal in the Barro tax smoothing model. As argued by Rebelo and Vegh (2002), the optimal
response to the permanent increase in spending entails a zero surplus response. In this context the exchange
rate must fail and seigniorage must increase immediately.
18Announcing a stronger ￿scal rule, in the wake of negative ￿scal shocks which increase the current de￿cit,
is not likely to be credible.
18equilibrium, thereby resolving the crisis, the real value of debt must fall and/or the expected
present-value of surpluses must rise. To characterize the crisis as well as the dynamics leading
up to a crisis in equilibrium, it is necessary to make assumptions about post-crisis policy.
2.5.2 Equilibrium under Active Fiscal and Passive Monetary Policy
We consider several post-crisis policy options. The ￿rst is a policy-switching response in
which the ￿scal authority switches to active ￿scal policy and the monetary authority switches
to passive policy as characterized by the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level." In this section,
we characterize equilibrium under active ￿scal policy and passive monetary policy in the
absence of upper bounds. The implications of upper bounds are discussed at the end of this
section.
De￿nition 2 Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, together
with a surplus rule from equation (8) with ￿ = 1 and a monetary policy setting it = i, an
equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the surplus, debt, and capital loss on debt,
fbt;st;￿tg
1
t=0, such that the government￿ s ￿ow and intertemporal budget constraints, given by
equations (9) and (5), hold, expectations are rational, and world agents expect to receive the
return on assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1).
The dynamic model for the equilibrium values of real debt and the real surplus is given by
equations (12) and (13). One root is 1+i and the other is 1￿￿. This is a saddlepath stable
model in which there are debt-surplus pairs for which the present-value of debt explodes in
the limit, implying failure of the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint. To assure
equilibrium, there must be one jumping variable to keep the system on the saddlepath. The
monetary authority￿ s interest rate target restricts Et￿1￿t = 0; but places no restrictions
on ￿t: Therefore, ￿t jumps, implying jumps in bt from equation (4), to keep the system
19on the saddlepath.19 Stochastic and symmetric20 surprise appreciations and depreciations
(￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t); ￿nance positive and negative stochastic surplus shocks. Since the system does
not reach an equilibrium for arbitrary starting values, this is an active ￿scal rule. Under the
assumption that the mean of ￿t is zero for all t > n; the solutions for the surplus and real
debt with active ￿scal policy are given by
st = ^ s +
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Since the solutions contain only the stable root once t > n, there is no long-run e⁄ect of
shocks; the expected value of the surplus in￿nitely far into the future is always ^ s:
When the mean of ￿t = 0; these equations imply an equilibrium saddlepath relationship








￿^ s + (1 ￿ ￿)st
￿
: (17)
The equations for the phase diagram can be computed by subtracting lagged values of
the surplus and debt, respectively from equations (8) and (9) with ￿ = 0 to yield
￿st = st ￿ st￿1 = ￿[^ s ￿ st￿1] + ￿t; (18)
























20In the active ￿scal policy regime with no possibility of policy switching, prices jump in response to ￿scal
shocks to keep the surplus and debt on the saddlepath. With rational expectations, price surprises must be
symmetric. See Daniel (2007).
21This requires jumps in ￿t to keep the coe¢ cient on the unstable root equal to zero, yielding ￿t = 1+i
￿+i￿t:
20￿bt = bt ￿ bt￿1 = ibt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿^ s ￿ (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) ￿ ￿t: (19)
The phase diagram is given in Figure 2, and the saddlepath is labeled SP. The system travels
along the saddlepath, labeled SP, to a long-run value for the surplus and debt at point F.
Shocks which send the system away from the saddlepath must be o⁄set by price surprises,
revaluing debt to keep the system on the saddlepath.
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Shocks other than current ￿scal shocks
Expected future ￿scal shocks Consider the e⁄ect of a current increase in expected
future expenditures in period h such that Et￿h < 0 where h > t: This future spending
shock requires additional revenue to assure intertemporal budget balance. Price surprises
21generate revenue, whereas anticipated price changes do not, implying that a price increase
on the date that expenditures rise cannot generate the necessary revenue. Therefore, the
price must jump on the date on which the future spending becomes anticipated. The jump
reduces real debt such that on the date the government increases spending, the associated
increase in debt and reduction in the surplus return the system to the original saddlepath.
Therefore, the increase in expected future government spending e⁄ectively moves debt below

















The system then follows the arrows of motion with the unstable root, implying falling debt
and an increasing surplus, until the date on which the spending increase occurs. After the
anticipated shocks have been realized, the surplus falls and debt increases returning the
system to the saddlepath relationship given by equation (17).
Change in the parameters of the surplus rule Government actions or political
instability could change agents￿beliefs about the parameters of the surplus rule. A reduction
in the magnitude of the target surplus, possibly due to a reduction in the upper bound, shifts
￿s = 0 left and shifts SP down. The system reaches the new saddlepath with an unexpected
price and exchange rate increase which reduces the real value of debt. A fall in the value of
￿; increasing the persistence of the surplus, increases the slope of the saddlepath, requiring
an o⁄setting price surprise to move the system to the new saddlepath.
22Upper Bounds Now, consider the role of upper bounds. The ￿rst implication of the upper
bound is that the long-run value for the target surplus must be below the upper bound.
Additionally, the upper bound on debt implies that the passive-monetary policy active-
￿scal policy regime is not viable inde￿nitely. When the system begins along the saddlepath
at a point below F, it travels toward F over time. Saddlepath values of ib > i￿ b are not
feasible, implying that in the neighborhood of i￿ b, policy makers must have plans to respond
when equilibrium under the current policy mix is not possible, possibly switching back to
passive ￿scal policy and active monetary policy. The upper bound on debt implies an upper
bound on the long-run target value for the primary surplus. The assumption in equation (7)
that ^ s ￿ ￿ s ￿ ￿ ￿ assures that under the initial ￿xed exchange rate policy mix, the system is
not in the neighborhood where reverse switching becomes possible.
3 Exchange Rate Crisis with Policy Switching
The previous section characterized equilibrium, ￿rst, under passive ￿scal policy and active
monetary policy (Regime 1), and, second, under active ￿scal policy and passive monetary
policy (Regime 2) in the absence of upper bounds. In both cases, we noted that upper
bounds imply that the initial policy mix might not be viable inde￿nitely. Therefore, in an
equilibrium with upper bounds, agents must form rational expectations about how policy
might change to assure equilibrium. In this section we consider an equilibrium in which
policy is initially in Regime 1 with plans to switch to Regime 2 once equilibrium in Regime 1
is no longer feasible. The policy switching model can be viewed as a dynamic "Fiscal Theory
23of the Price Level" model of exchange rate crises.22
To allow Regime 1 to be initially viable, but subject to risk, we assume that the initial
values satisfy st￿1 < ibt￿1 < ^ s: This implies that debt is rising, and that debt service is low
enough to place the system below the saddlepath to ^ s:
3.1 Equilibrium with Upper Bounds and Policy Switching
De￿nition 3 Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, an upper
bound on the long-run value of debt, a policy mix, de￿ned by a surplus rule from equation
(8) with ￿ = 1 and a monetary policy ￿xing the exchange rate, which the government will
maintain as long as possible, and plans for policy-switching in the event that the initial policy
mix becomes infeasible, an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the surplus, debt,
and capital loss on debt, fbt;st;￿tg
1
t=0, such that the government￿ s ￿ow and intertemporal
budget constraints, given by equations (9) and (5), hold, expectations are rational, debt does
not exceed its upper bound in the long-run, and world agents expect to receive the return on
assets determined by interest rate parity, equation (1).
We de￿ne a crisis as a period t = T in which there is no equilibrium under the initial
￿xed-exchange-rate, passive-￿scal-policy mix. The symptom in markets is that agents refuse
to lend at any interest rate.
3.2 Exchange Rate Depreciation and Expectations
To determine expectations of exchange rate depreciation leading up to a crisis, it is necessary
to look forward to determinants of equilibrium on the crisis date. Equilibrium requires that
the system begin on the saddlepath to ^ s: For equilibrium conditions to be satis￿ed under
the post-crisis policy combination, ￿t must be free to jump on the date of the crisis to place
22Daniel (2001b) presents a ￿scal theory exchange rate crisis model in which an unanticipated shock causes
the solvency crisis. Uribe(2006) presents a ￿scal theory model in which the role of devaluation is to eliminate
hyperin￿ ation, not restore ￿scal solvency. Sims (1997) presents an FTPL switching model with switching
and exchange rate crisis conditioned on the level of government debt, and Cochrane (2003, 2005) notes that
the FTPL can explain a currency crisis.
24the system on the saddlepath associated with the ￿scal authority￿ s target surplus, equation
(17). Additionally, equilibrium expectations of ￿t must be rational.
To determine the probability of a crisis next period and one-period-ahead expectations
of capital loss due to exchange rate depreciation, it is useful to compare the value of debt
along the saddlepath to the long-run target surplus (^ s); given by (17), with the current value
under passive policy, given by (13). Using equations (17) and (13), this distance at time t
can be expressed as
￿t = (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) +
1 + i
￿ + i
[￿t￿1 + vt]: (21)




(^ s ￿ ibt￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(st￿1 ￿ ibt￿1): (22)
The state variable determining the time t distance is known at time t ￿ 1, and therefore
receives a t ￿ 1 subscript. In equation (21), the distance depends on the expectation of
depreciation, on realizations of the surplus shock and depreciation, and on ￿t￿1:
When faced with a crisis in which it cannot borrow the desired amount, the
government announces a policy switch in which it sets ￿ = 0 in the ￿scal rule,
e⁄ectively replacing debt service with a long-run surplus target of ^ s ￿ ￿ s￿￿ ￿. Since
the post-crisis debt-surplus system is saddlepath stable, the distance between the value of
debt along the saddlepath to ^ s and its current value must be zero in order for the the
post-crisis system to approach ^ s in the long run.
We de￿ne a shadow value of depreciation, analogous to the shadow value of the exchange
rate in generation one currency crisis models (Flood and Garber 1984). The shadow value of
25depreciation represents the reduction in the value of debt needed for the economy to reach
the saddlepath to ^ s, equivalently to set ￿t = 0. The shadow value can be positive or negative.
De￿nition 4 The shadow value of capital loss on debt due to default at time t; ~ ￿t; is
de￿ned as the value of ￿t for which ￿t = 0:
Setting ￿t = 0 in equation (21) and solving yields
~ ￿t = Et￿1￿t ￿
1 + i
￿ + i
(￿t￿1 + vt): (23)
Using equations (4), (13), and (17), we can show that under the initial passive ￿scal
policy with ￿t = 0; ￿t evolves as
￿t = ￿(￿ + i)Et￿1￿t + (1 + i)(￿t￿1 + ￿t) ￿ ￿(^ s ￿ ibt): (24)
Using equations (23) and (24), the state variable determining the distance at time t+1 (￿t)
can be expressed in terms of the shadow rate of depreciation at time t as
￿t = ￿(￿ + i) ~ ￿t ￿ ￿(^ s ￿ ibt): (25)
Since we have assumed that the system is in a region for which ^ s￿ibt > 0; the state variable
determining the distance in period t+1 (￿t) could be negative even though the shadow rate of
depreciation is negative today (~ ￿t < 0): This is because the passive-￿scal-policy adjustment
path is steeper than the saddlepath, so that, even in the absence of shocks and expected
depreciation, debt rises relatively faster under passive ￿scal policy, than under active in the
region for which ^ s ￿ ibt > 0.
We assume that the ￿scal authority never revalues in response to a crisis in which it
cannot borrow. Instead, it chooses to reduce its post-crisis target surplus below ^ s in the
26event that borrowing constraints bind and ~ ￿t > 0: It is necessary to determine conditions
under which borrowing constraints bind.
Assume that agents believe that the ￿scal borrowing constraint will bind,
creating depreciation if ~ ￿t > 0:23 We prove that this assumption is consistent with a
rational expectations equlibrium below. This implies that the actual value for depreciation
in the crisis period is given by
￿t = maxf~ ￿t;0g: (26)
To solve for rational expectations of depreciation, de￿ne a critical value for ￿t, given by
￿￿
t; as the minimum value for ￿t which sets ￿t = 0: Therefore, for ￿t < ￿￿
t; ￿t > 0; and
for ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t; ￿t = 0: Letting f (vt) be a bounded, symmetric, mean-zero distribution for ￿t;














[￿t￿1 + vt] + Et￿1￿t
￿
f (￿t)d￿t:
A solution for Et￿1￿t exists if there is a solution for ￿￿
t: De￿ning F (￿￿
t) as the cumulative
at ￿￿
t and collecting terms on the expectation yields
















Substituting into equation (23), using equation (26), yields an expression for ￿t as




















23The constraint could also bind with ~ ￿t < 0, but given the assumption that the authorities never revalue,
such a crisis would not entail depreciation.
27Assume that the economy is in period t = T. To determine whether there exists an equi-
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T+1: A solution for ￿￿
T+1 exists i⁄ there exists a value for ￿￿
T+1, satisfying
￿￿ v ￿ ￿￿
T+1 ￿ ￿ v; such that ￿T + ￿
T+1 = 0.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium solution for ￿￿
T+1 when ￿T < 0:
Proof. The proof requires showing that ￿
T+1 ￿ 0 for all feasible values for ￿￿
T+1: Let ￿￿
T+1
take on its smallest possible value of ￿￿ v, implying that ￿
T+1 = ￿￿ v < 0: The derivative of
￿
T+1 with respect to ￿￿






T+1 < ￿ v, this is positive. Therefore,
as ￿￿
T+1 rises, ￿
T+1 rises monotonically. Once ￿￿
T+1 takes on its largest possible value, given
by ￿ v, 1 ￿ F (￿ v) = 0, and ￿
T+1 takes on its maximum value of zero. Therefore, ￿
T+1 ￿ 0 for
all feasible values of ￿￿
T+1: This implies that when ￿T < 0; there is no feasible value for ￿￿
T+1
which sets ￿T = 0 in equation (28).
Intuitively, if the system were allowed to continue into period T + 1 with ￿T < 0; then
the probability of devaluation in period T +1; conditional on information in period T; would
be unity. Taking expectations of equation (26), using equation (23) when the probability of
devaluation is unity, yields





T+1 = ￿ v:
This equation has a solution for the expectation only if ￿T = 0: When ￿T < 0; there can be
no value for devaluation such that it equals its expectation minus a negative gap.







Proof. When ￿T = 0; ￿
T+1 = 0; implying that ￿￿
T+1 = ￿ v: With ￿￿
T+1 equal to its upper bound,
any realization of vT+1 requires devaluation, implying that the probability of devaluation
is unity. Together, a unitary probability of devaluation and ￿T = 0 imply that ￿T+1 =





￿T+1, which must be greater than or equal to zero for any realization











￿ ￿; ￿T+1 ￿ 0 for any realization of ￿T+1:








can be arbitrarily large. However, when the government is following passive ￿scal
policy and active monetary policy, the probability that shocks will occur, such that ￿T takes
on a value exactly equal to zero, is zero. Therefore, given passive ￿scal policy and active
monetary policy ￿xing the exchange rate, a crisis with a unitary probability and arbitrarily
high expectations of devaluation has probability zero.
Lemma 3 When ￿T > 0; the probability of a crisis with devaluation in period T + 1 is less
than one, and equation (27) has a well-de￿ned solution for ET￿T+1.
Proof. When ￿T > 0; equation (28) implies that ￿
T+1 < 0; implying that ￿￿
T+1 < ￿ v:





; is less than
one. Equation (27) can be solved for ET￿T+1:
These three lemmas characterize feasible equlibrium positions under the initial policy
mix, leading to the following proposition.





; and the government borrows its desired amount
under passive ￿scal policy. When ￿T < 0, there is no interest rate in period T which can
compensate agents for expectations of depreciation, implying that there is no equilibrium
under the initial policy mix.
Proof. For ￿T = 0; Lemma 2 demonstrates that the probability of a crisis with depreciaiton
is unity and provides a lower bound for the equilibrium expectation of depreciation. For
￿T > 0, Lemma 3 demonstrates that the probability of a crisis with depreciation is less
than one, and equation (27) can be used to solve for expected depreciation. For both cases,
solutions for expected depreciation, together with equation (1) yield an equilibrium interest
rate. For ￿T < 0, Lemma 1 shows that there is no solution for expectations of depreciation.
Therefore, there is no value of the interest rate which can compensate agents for lending,
implying that these positions cannot satisfy the de￿nition of equilibrium.
Proposition 2 When ￿T < 0, policy switching designed to set ￿T = 0; restores equilibrium.
Proof. Policy switching restores equilibrium by setting ￿T = 0, placing the system on the
saddlepath to the long-run target value for the primary surplus. There are two cases to
consider. When ~ ￿T < 0; devaluation with ￿T = ~ ￿T; sets ￿T = 0: When ￿T < 0; but ~ ￿T > 0;
the government does not revalue. Instead, it chooses a target surplus ^ s0 < ^ s, such that the
system is on the saddlepath to a lower target surplus without an exchange rate change. That
is, it replaces ^ s with ^ s0 in equation (22), substitutes this into equation (23) and solves for ^ s0
which sets the new expression for ~ ￿T = 0:
We can summarize the argument as follows. Agents believe that the government will
switch policies and allow the currency to depreciate as necessary when it cannot borrow the
30amount needed to continue passive ￿scal policy. Agents refuse to lend when there is no value
for the interest rate, based on the expected value for depreciation, which can compensate
then for expectations of capital loss on debt. Policy switching is the response to the inability
to borrow, validating agents beliefs that the government will switch policies and allow non-
negative depreciation when it cannot borrow.
De￿nition 5 Conditional on the expectation that a lending crisis will be resolved with policy
switching to keep expected values for future debt from rising above ^ s
i ￿ ￿ s
i; a boundary path
for debt service (ib) is given by the saddlepath leading to ^ s:
Note that the boundary path is de￿ned with respect to the government￿ s desired long-run
values for the surplus and debt, not by their upper bounds. Equation (21) shows that for
￿t = ￿t = Et￿1￿t = 0; a positive value for ￿t￿1 implies that the current value of debt, bt; is
below the boundary locus. However, ￿scal shocks (￿t), expectations of default (Et￿1￿t), and
default (￿t) can all a⁄ect the position of bt relative to the boundary locus.
Phase diagrams are useful to understand how such a crisis could arise. Figure 3 superim-
poses the ￿s = 0 curve and the saddlepath for the active-￿scal-policy system on the phase
diagram for the passive-￿scal-policy system.
31s












Consider the dynamics leading up to a crisis, using the phase diagram in Figure 3, when the
only shocks are current ￿scal surplus shocks. When the system is far below SP, say at point
A with ￿t￿1 > ￿ ￿; then no shock could send the system above SP, and the arrows of motion
for the passive-￿scal-policy system govern. Consider the feasibility of a position like C. Point
C is feasible because the expectation of a regime switch in the future raises the expected
present-value surplus to equal the value of outstanding debt. As the system approaches the
saddlepath so that ￿t￿1 < ￿ ￿, the market begins to anticipate depreciation, given by equation
(27). This anticipation forces the interest rate to increase to incorporate the increase in
expected in￿ ation from equation (1). The monetary authority allows the interest rate to rise
32to keep the current exchange rate ￿xed. Therefore, debt is expected to increase more quickly
than implied by the locus CD, reaching SP at a point like E.
A crisis occurs when agents refuse to lend, and there are two ways in which this can
happen. Conditional on ￿T￿1 > 0; a surplus shock smaller than the cricital value could
send the system above the saddlepath in period T such that ￿T < 0 and ~ ￿T < 0. Such
a position cannot represent an equilibrium, and regime switching with depreciation brings
the system to the saddlepath.24 Alternatively, the dynamics of the surplus and debt under
passive policy could imply that debt next period in the absence of the regime switch would
travel above the saddlepath such that ￿T < 0; but ~ ￿T > 0. Agents will not lend into this
position since no rationally-expected value for the future depreciation could place the system
on a stable path. A regime-switch allows debt and the surplus to move along a saddlepath
below SP, implying a long-run surplus below ^ s: When a sudden stop occurs with debt below
the saddlepath, there is no depreciation. After the regime switch, capital gains and losses
on debt due to exchange rate changes are symmetric, implying that expectations of in￿ ation
and exchange rate change are again zero.
Corollary 1 A government which wants to sustain current ￿scal policy as long as possible
chooses the largest feasible target value for the long-run surplus.
Proof. By Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, the probability of a crisis is determined by the boundary
locus. The position of the boundary locus is determined by ^ s; and the boundary locus is
higher the larger is ^ s:
24Since the probability of devaluation is less than one, when a shock occurs requiring devaluation, its mag-
nitude is greater than expected allowing b to jump downwards.
333.2.1 Shocks Other Than Current Fiscal Shocks
Any shock which changes the position of the post-crisis equilibrium value of debt a⁄ects the
value of ￿T: Therefore, these shocks can cause a crisis or increase the probability of one.
Again assume that the economy in Regime 1 is in the range for which sT < ibT < ^ s:
Expected future ￿scal shocks An increase in expected future government spending
reduces the post-crisis equilibrium value of debt according to equation (20). This reduces
the value of ￿T:
Changes in the parameters of the surplus rule A reduction in the expected long-run
target value of the surplus shifts the saddlepath down, reducing ￿T for any given value of
debt. A change in the policy parameters in the ￿scal rule, for example a reduction in the
responsiveness of government spending to debt (reduction in ￿) increases the slope of the
saddlepath without increasing long-run equilibrium values, directly reducing ￿T.
4 Alternative Policy Responses to a Crisis
Policy-switching is only one possible response to a crisis that policy makers might choose.
In this section, we brie￿ y consider others.
4.1 Devalue and Repeg at a Lower Rate
The government could also devalue and repeg the exchange rate at a lower value to reach
the adjustment path toward its target surplus without any ￿scal policy change. In this case
monetary policy must allow the interest rate to be determined by expectations of devaluation
34to satisfy interest rate parity, equation (1), defending the ￿xed exchange rate. Let ￿t￿1 be
rede￿ned as the state variable determining the distance between the target value for debt,
given by ^ s=i; and the current expectation of its long-run value under passive ￿scal policy
from equation (11).25 This policy implies the second proposition.
Proposition 3 A policy in which the government devalues to place the system on the ad-
justment path toward ^ s and repegs at the lower rate without ￿scal reform will fail next period
with probability one.
Proof. After devaluation to place the system on the desired adjustment path, ￿T = 0; and




are at least as high as ￿ ￿
￿, implying high interest rates.26 With probability one, the
￿xed rate fails in the subsequent period with a devaluation and in every period thereafter.
Post-crisis equilibrium is characterized by repeated exchange rate depreciation which
can be arbitrarily large in magnitude. Expectations of depreciation must be large enough
that depreciation occurs for any ￿scal shock. This is because the government is assumed
never to revalue to reach its target adjustment path. Expectations of depreciation must be
correct on average, implying that expectations of depreciation must be the average value
of depreciation. Therefore, following the crisis, markets remain turbulent. Agents expect
additional depreciation, interest rates are high, and additional depreciation is necessary.
Given sustained post-crisis turbulence, it would be di¢ cult to make a case that this policy
represents optimal response.
25￿t￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)st￿1 ￿ ￿bt￿1 +
1￿(1￿￿)(1+i)
i ￿ s and the distance is given by ￿t =
￿t￿1+￿t+￿(Et￿1￿t￿￿t)
1￿(1￿￿)(1+i) : For a
derivation, see Daniel (2007).
26The shadow rate of devaluation is given by ~ ￿t = Et￿1￿t + 1
￿ [￿t￿1 + vt]: With ￿t￿1 = 0; Et￿1￿t ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿:
354.2 Default
The government could plan to respond to a crisis by reneging on its no-default commitment.
Both default and devaluation reduce the real value of outstanding debt moving the, system
toward the ^ s￿saddlepath. The larger the default, the smaller the devaluation and vice
versa. However, given that default typically takes time to resolve and given that agents
usually do not know the magnitude of default, expectations about the magnitude could be
volatile, implying a volatile exchange rate until a value for default is ￿nalized. Since default
solves the same ￿scal solvency problem as devaluation, default and devaluation can occur
together.27
4.3 IMF Loan
Assume that the country plans to resolve the crisis by securing an IMF loan to replace the
private market source of loans it looses in a crisis. To simplify the presentation and contrast
this policy with those preceding it, we assume there is no accompanying debt devaluation
either through depreciation or default. An IMF loan with debt devaluation would be analyzed
as a combination of the two policy responses.
The IMF is willing to make the loan when the private market is not because the IMF can
force ￿scal policy change as a condition for receiving the loan. IMF programs for countries
with ￿scal problems usually require an increase in the value of the government surplus for a
speci￿c period of time. We model this as an increase in the mean of ￿t for a speci￿c period
27For an analysis of default as a response to the crisis, see Daniel and Shiamptanis (2008). The interest rate
parity equation must be modi￿ed such that the world interest rate is equated with the expected return on
the domestic asset, conditional on the possibility of default.
36of time. In Figure 1, this ￿ attens the adjustment path, leading to a lower expected value for
the long-run surplus, restoring ￿scal solvency. E⁄ectively, the government￿ s intertemporal
budget constraint is restored because the present value of future surpluses rises, not because
the real value of debt falls. With this policy, expectations of depreciation are always zero.
5 Model Applied to Recent Currency Crises
In this section we illustrate the implications of the ￿scal solvency model for several recent
currency crises not explained well by the standard generation one model. Fiscal solvency
remains essential in the explanation but future seigniorage is not. Crises are caused by
current ￿scal shocks combined with loss of con￿dence in the ￿scal rule, expected future
￿scal shocks, and a policy of devaluation and repegging without policy switching, leading to
expectations of further devaluation.
5.1 Argentina 2001: Current Fiscal Shocks and Loss of Con￿dence
The ￿rst crisis we consider is the Argentine crisis in 2001. This crisis cannot be explained
by a generation one model since the currency board prevented money-￿nanced government
de￿cits and made a total run on reserves impossible. Yet, government de￿cits and rising
government debt did precede the crisis, and the crisis was characterized by both currency
depreciation and sovereign default, highlighting the role of ￿scal problems. Simulations
of the ￿scal solvency model imply that the Argentine crisis was caused by a combination
of a negative ￿scal shocks stemming from the 1998 recession, a reduced surplus-response to
government debt (￿), and a crisis of con￿dence reducing the expectations for the governments
37long-run target value for the primary surplus (^ s):
For the simulations, we assume that the values for the surplus and debt in the model
represent ratios to GDP, implying that the interest rate variable is the growth-adjusted real
interest rate. We assume that the growth-adjusted real interest rate is .02, based on real
interest rates of about 5-6% and reasonable expected growth rates of 3-4%. We let the upper
bound on the target surplus be 1.5% of GDP, larger than any surplus achieved in the 1990￿ s,
although not larger than the IMF target surpluses for the short run. At this interest rate, the
upper bound on the surplus implies an upper bound on debt of 75% of GDP. The stabilization
program initiated in 1991 involved not only the currency board but a strong ￿scal policy
as indicated by small persistence in the surplus. We have too little data to estimate the
parameters of the ￿scal rule followed at the beginning of the stabilization program with any
con￿dence. Using IMF data (IMF 2003 and Krueger 2002) on the primary surplus and debt
for the consolidated public sector, including federal and provincial governments, as a fraction
of GDP from 1991-1998, we estimate a value for ￿ of .6028, and argue that this strong ￿scal
stance is consistent with initial policy.
In 1991, the value of debt was 38:5% of GDP, while the surplus was ￿:5%: We use
a uniform distribution to generate surplus shocks and let bounds on the distribution be
￿2% of GDP since surplus shocks this large were observed. We use 5,000 simulations to
calculate the probability of a crisis in twenty years. If we assume that a crisis would be
resolved with a switch to active ￿scal policy and passive monetary policy, then the initial
28We use the regression coe¢ cient of the change in the surplus on the surplus less debt service calculated at
i = :02 when the constant is forced to be zero.
38position of Argentina in 1991 was well below the upper bound path, given by the saddlepath
leading to a surplus of 1.5% of GDP. Given these parameter values, simulations show that
the stabilization program initiated by Argentina was very safe with the probability of a crisis
in twenty years almost zero.
The 1998 recession brought large ￿scal de￿cits, and debt increased to 50.9% of GDP by
the end of 2000. However, simulations with the higher debt and the surplus at its 2000 value
of -.1% show that the increase in debt alone would not have increased the probability of a
crisis, had Argentina maintained its strong ￿scal stance. With the same ￿scal rule and the
same upper bound on the surplus, simulations show that the probability of a crisis in ten
years remains close to zero. Therefore, according to the model, the increase in debt due to
negative ￿scal shocks alone cannot explain the crisis.
It is reasonable to argue that the 1998 recession weakened both the ￿scal stance as well as
con￿dence in ￿scal policy. Large ￿scal de￿cits are consistent with both a string of negative
￿scal shocks and a change in the ￿scal rule whereby surpluses become more persistent and
less responsive to debt as ￿ falls. Fiscal policy from 1998-2001 is more consistent with a value
of ￿ =.17.29 Additionally, a crisis of con￿dence could have lowered the public￿ s expectation
of upper bound on the surplus which the government could sustain, so we assume that
the upper bound falls from 1.5% to 1.25% implying a fall in the upper bound on debt to
62.5%. With the weaker ￿scal stance and reduced con￿dence, the probability of a crisis in
ten years increases to 77% with the mean time to a crisis being two years. Therefore, the
model with a reduction in the surplus-responsiveness of debt and a lower upper bound on
29This is the regression estimate for ￿ using four years of data from 1998-2001.
39the surplus predicts the crisis which occurred. The crisis did not occur immediately with the
1998 recession because there was still some possibility that it could be avoided.
The simulations imply that reduced responsiveness of ￿scal policy to debt was key to
generating the crisis. Had the initial 1991 stabilization program been accompanied by the
weaker ￿scal stance we assumed occurred with the 1998 recession, then simulations show
that the program would have been much less safe with crisis probability over the next twenty
years rising to 35% with mean time to a crisis being about ten years. This illustrates the
importance of the strong ￿scal stance, represented by a large response of the surplus to debt,
for the viability of the initial stabilization program.
Therefore, the model implies that the initial monetary and ￿scal reform in 1991 in Ar-
gentina was sound. If Argentina had maintained a ￿scal rule like that it initiated in the
beginning of the reform, then it would have likely avoided the crisis. The recession brought
not only negative surplus shocks, but also a weakened ￿scal rule and reduced con￿dence in
￿scal policy, substantially raising the probability of a crisis.
5.2 Mexico 1994-95: Devaluation and Repeg without Policy Switch-
ing
The Mexican crisis was not preceded by money-￿nanced government de￿cits (Calvo and
Mendoza 1996, Cole and Kehoe, 1996). Instead, primary surpluses had exceeded 1% of GDP
since 1983, and debt as a fraction of GDP was falling. At the end of 1993, debt was 25.3% of
GDP.30 Mexico was at a point like G in Figure 1, moving toward a target surplus well below
30Primary surplus data are from Banco de Mexico website: http://www/banxico.org.mx/ under "Public
Finances" and other data is from IFS Statistics.
40its upper bound. The country was not experiencing ￿scal solvency problems in any standard
sense and cannot be explained by a generation one model. The ￿scal solvency model can
explain Mexico￿ s crisis if we assume that the surprise 15% devaluation of the peso relative
to the US dollar in December 1994 was a signal that the government planned to respond to
shocks, which moved it away from its desired adjustment path, with devaluation, but not
with revaluation or ￿scal reform.
Under this assumption, the devaluation set ￿T = 0: Since the distance to the desired
adjustment path was zero after the devaluation, and only devaluation would be used to
o⁄set future ￿scal shocks, expected future devaluation could be arbitrarily high from Lemma
2, and the new peg would fail with probability one from Proposition 2. This is indeed
what happened. Interest rates shot up, re￿ ecting further expected devaluations. Additional
speculative attacks and devaluations followed. If Mexico had explicitly switched to ￿ exible
exchange rates, as in the switching model presented above, then post-crisis expectations of
future exchange rate change would have been zero. The repegging at a lower rate implied that
the government would react to future negative shocks with devaluation but would maintain
the exchange rate with future positive shocks. This created large expectations of devaluation,
e⁄ectively causing devaluation even when there were positive ￿scal shocks.
A policy to restore con￿dence and change the perception that the government would
use future debt devaluation to achieve ￿scal goals was necessary to end the crisis. It is
reasonable to argue that the large US loan illustrated US con￿dence in the government,
restoring private con￿dence, thereby strengthening expectations about ￿scal rule parameters,
41possibly by raising ^ s and/or ￿, and increasing ￿T.
5.3 Southeast Asia 1997: Expected Future Government Expendi-
tures
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (BER 2001, 2006) have convincingly argued that the
currency crises in Southeast Asia were due to expected future increases in government ex-
penditures to ￿nance the banking crisis. However, their model remains couched in terms of
the generation one currency crisis model in which an increase in future money growth and
seigniorage is a necessary component in restoring ￿scal solvency. This leads to a model of the
timing of a currency crisis based on an assumption that money will take a discrete upward
jump on a particular future date and then grow faster after that date.
The solvency model generates a currency crisis due to an increase in expected future
government expenditures, irrespective of any assumptions about future monetary growth.
Under the assumption that the government will respond to a crisis with policy switching,
the increase in expected future spending lowers the maximum value of current debt consistent
with the ￿xed exchange rate policy mix and the current value for the surplus. Equivalently,
we could capitalize the present value of expected future spending into a current value, add
this to debt, and compare the sum to the old upper bound path for debt. A crisis occurs as
soon as agents refuse to lend because they believe that the government￿ s desire to borrow
would place it above the path toward its upper bound.
Consider Thailand, where the crisis ￿rst erupted. Primary surpluses and strong GDP
growth had reduced total government debt from a peak in 1986 of 36.5% of GDP to only
423.8% by the end of 1996.31 In Figure 1, Thailand was at a point like G. However, in 1996
the country entered a recession, and reductions in land and stock market values created
a ￿nancial sector crisis. BER (2001) present estimates of the costs of recapitalizating the
banking sector of 30 to 35% of GDP. Capitalizing this into current debt implies that the
country￿ s e⁄ective debt/GDP was similar to that in 1986. Its surplus/GDP was larger at
.9% of GDP in 1996 compared to -3% in 1986. Even though the recession could have implied
expected near-term negative surplus shocks, it is di¢ cult to argue that if the government
was expected to follow the same ￿scal rule it had followed earlier, that agents would have
believed that it was near ￿scal insolvency in 1996, when it was clearly solvent in 1986.
The di⁄erence between the two periods lies in the ￿nancial sector crisis and political
uncertainty over the ￿scal implications of its resolution. The political uncertainty could
have caused agents to believe either that the government could not maintain its strong ￿scal
rule or that its upper-bound surplus was smaller, both reducing the value for debt along the
upper-bound path. This reduction could have contributed to the perception that government
borrowing would place debt on an unsustainable path. The exchange rate remained volatile in
subsequent months, with gains and losses, but with losses dominating, until the government
had determined how to handle the banking crisis. Volatile exchange rates are consistent with
volatile expectations about the present-value of future surpluses under active ￿scal policy.
Korea also faced a banking crisis with estimates of the cost of restructuring the banking
system at 24-30% of GDP (BER 2001). Also similar to Thailand, the country had experienced
primary government surpluses for four years and debt was only 7.5% of GDP at the end of
31Data is from IFS.
431996. However, if future liabilities are capitalized into current debt, then debt/GDP was
almost twice as large as its largest value since 1980 (17% of GDP in 1982) and well above
its mean value of 12% since 1980.32 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that agents believed
that Korea faced a ￿scal solvency problem. Additionally, concern over the ￿scal response
to the banking crisis could have led agents to believe that the government would adopt a
weaker ￿scal stance, further increasing the probability of a crisis.
5.4 Other Crises
These crises are meant to illustrate the major types of shocks which can cause ￿scal ￿nancial
crises, including current ￿scal shocks, expected future ￿scal shocks, loss of con￿dence in
current ￿scal policy which reduces the expected value of future ￿scal surpluses, and deval-
uation to respond to a current shock with implicit promises to use additional devaluation
to respond to future shocks. We could use the model to analyze many other actual crises.
At the time of this paper￿ s writing, Iceland is experiencing a crisis in which the estimated
future government expenditures necessary to recapitalize the banking system are something
like 80% of GDP. The country has experienced a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows, its currency
has depreciated sharply, and it is negotiating for an IMF loan. Equilibrium in the sense of
the model has not yet been restored as private capital is not ￿ owing at any interest rate,
implying that markets believe the government remains in an insolvent position.
32Data are from IFS.
446 Conclusions
This paper provides a dynamic model of currency crises which retains ￿scal solvency as the
central cause, as in generation one models. However, it replaces the initial inconsistent policy
mix of the generation one model with a policy mix which fails with positive probability. And
it replaces the role of seigniorage in restoring ￿scal solvency with debt devaluation, created
by currency depreciation. The model is the product of insights from the original generation
one model, which highlights ￿scal solvency as a key fundamental in exchange rate crises, and
the FTPL, which allows capital gains and losses on debt to maintain ￿scal solvency.
When stochastic shocks move the government￿ s desired debt above the path leading to
the long-run upper bound, agents refuse to lend, precipitating a crisis. The crisis could be
caused by current ￿scal shocks, which raise desired debt and reduce the current surplus,
by expectations of new future ￿scal commitments which raise the expected present-value
of future surpluses, or by a change in the current ￿scal rule or the expectation of such
a change. Agents will not lend and equilibrium cannot be restored until policy responds
to restore expectations of ￿scal solvency. One possibility is a regime switch, in which the
￿scal rule becomes active and monetary policy becomes passive, as in the FTPL. This allows
future price level (and exchange rate) surprises to o⁄set stochastic surplus shocks and usually
requires exchange rate depreciation in the crisis period to reduce the outstanding value of
debt. A policy of devaluation to restore ￿scal solvency without a change in the ￿scal rule
will restore equilibrium, but at the cost of arbitrarily high expected future devaluation and
interest rates. Cumulative exchange rate depreciation is lower the sooner ￿scal reform is
45implemented. This result highlights the importance of ￿scal reform in restoring orderly
markets after a crisis. Since currency depreciation and sovereign default both restore ￿scal
solvency, they can occur together.
We apply the model to explain crises in Argentina (2001), Mexico (1994), and Southeast
Asia (1997), which do not ￿t the stylized facts of generation one crisis models. The model
can be used to attribute the Argentine crisis to negative ￿scal shocks and a change in the
￿scal rule, perhaps caused by the recession. Both currency depreciation and default on sov-
ereign debt were used to restore ￿scal solvency. The Mexican crisis can be explained by the
surprise devaluation which signaled the government￿ s willingness to use debt devaluation to
keep debt along its desired adjustment path. The crises in Southeast Asia can be attributed
to large expected future government expenditures to recapitalize banks, as argued by Burn-
side, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001, 2006), as well as political uncertainty over the ￿scal
implications of their resolution in Thailand and possible contagion in South Korea.
The model advances on Daniel (2001b) by providing a dynamic "Fiscal Theory of the
Price Level" model of currency crises as well as by considering responses to currency crises
other than policy switching. The FTPL model of currency crises advances on policy switching
models by Sims (1997) and Davig and Leeper (2006) and Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007)
by allowing policy switching to be the endogenous response to a crisis, which resolves the
crisis by restoring ￿scal solvency. It highlights the danger of using devaluation without ￿scal
reform to restore solvency. More generally, the model provides additional support for viewing
￿scal policy as a key determinant of exchange rate crises.
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